The article traces the evolution of the legal competences of the European Union (EU) in international investment regulation from the Spaak Report (1956) to the Lisbon Treaty (2009). It focuses on the question why and how the EU gradually acquired legal competences in this key domain of global economic governance. The analysis suggests that Commission entrepreneurship and spill-overs from other EU policies were the most important factors fuelling the extension of the EU's legal competences. The Member States, on the other hand, sought to prevent a competence transfer. European business -arguably the main stakeholder -was mostly uninterested or divided regarding the EU's role in international investment policy. The findings have implications for our perception of business lobbying in international investment policy and potentially for the legal interpretation and delimitation of the EU's new competences.
Introduction
The The article intends to make a threefold contribution. First, it closes an empirical gap in the literature on the EU's political and legal genesis as an actor in the international investment regime. Second, the article contributes to better delimit the exact scope of the EU's new exclusive competences by shedding some light on the rationale behind the competence transfer. Finally, it shows that business may be less of driver of international investment policy-making than conventionally thought.
First Steps -The EU and International Investment Regulation from the 1950s to the 1980s
It was only in the 1980s that international investment became an important economic phenomenon.
Hence, it was only at that point that intense policy debates on the role and competences of the EU and the Member States in this domain started. It is, however, worth mentioning that European policymakers touched twice on this issue in the early years of European Integration when preparing the Treaty of Rome and in discussions on Opinion 1/75 on the need to harmonise Member States' export policies.
The Treaty of Rome
The Treaty of Rome did not provide the EU with legal competences in the regulation of international Keynesianism postulated far-reaching state intervention in the economy and in particular control over cross-border capital flows to enable governments to use monetary policy and interest rates for macroeconomic steering. Only when policy-makers turned toward neo-liberalism in the 1980s, which foresaw the strengthening of market mechanisms for an efficient allocation of resources within and across economies, they showed willing to dismantle capital controls within the Common Market.
Opinion 1/75 -the Commission Pushes for a European BIT Program
The EU's role in the regulation of international investment policy became again the subject of debates The Member States met the draft regulations with great hesitation. 9 The Council criticised that the harmonisation of national export policy had priority over the creation of a complementary EU policy.
The German government stressed that national export policies provided sufficient coverage to all European investment and export projects. The German Bundestag warned that the creation of a EU investment guarantee scheme would bear incalculable financial risks for German taxpayers. The
French government sought to protect its competences and sovereignty. The EU was entitled to harmonise national policies, but did not hold the necessary competences to become a proper actor in this domain. In order to force the Member States to accept its draft regulations, the Commission had recourse to legal review in Opinion 1/75. 10 The Opinion examined and recognised the EU's legal competence to harmonise national export policies. The Opinion did not, however, provide a basis to push for a European BIT program.
The Treaty of Maastricht
Lasting in-depth debates on the EU's competences in international investment policy began with the Uruguay Round in the GATT and the IGC on the Maastricht Treaty. The Maastricht IGC touched on the EU's legal competences in international investment policy in the context of the negotiations on the Treaty chapters on the CCP and the free movement of capital. While the Commission was unsuccessful in its attempt to assert competences over international investment regulation in negotiations about the CCP, the EU accidentally acquired legal fringe competences regarding investment liberalisation under the revised chapter on capital movements. 7 Johannsen (n 6) 5-6; Seidl-Hohenveldern (n 6) 54-59. 8 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Communities (n 4). 9 For this and the following see Johannsen (n 6) 5-6 and Seidl-Hohenveldern (n 6) 56 -59. While it had not been the intention of the Member States, the creation of an external capital regime inevitably gave the EU a role in regulating investment market access. Cross-border capital movements constitute an important component of market access, the establishment and subsequent operation of foreign affiliates. As the EU acquired a shared competence over cross-border capital movements, the EU equally acquired a shared competence of relevance in international investment policy.
The Commission Fails to 'Update' the Common Commercial Policy

Court Battles over the Scope of the Common Commercial Policy
During the IGC on the Maastricht Treaty, the Member States had brushed off the Commission's attempt to 'clarify' the allegedly highly comprehensive scope of the CCP. As the following section 46 Johannsen (n 6) 9. 47 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), <https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats.pdf> accessed 3 June 2016.
service-related investment now came under the CCP, as the Member States had refused to extend the CCP to investment regulation. 48 In the following time, however, the opinio juris formed that the Member States had intended to empower the EU to participate in GATS-like negotiations on services trade. The new competence thus had to encompass the regulation of service-related investment liberalisation and arguably post-establishment treatment.
The Treaty of Lisbon
The 
Commission Entrepreneurship in the Open and Behind the Scenes of the Convention
2 The Member State Delegates Seek the Deletion of the 'FDI' Reference
Following the drafting exercise of the Praesidium, the delegates of the Convention reconvened for plenary sessions to discuss the Praesidium's draft text of the 'external action' chapter. The delegates were highly interested in the draft chapter on 'external action'. They tabled some 1,000 amendments 
Business Preferences -Ambivalent and Divided
European business seemed generally little interested in the debates on a reform of the CCP. What is more, the preferences of European business were ambivalent and divided. Only UNICE -today There is a good case for the extension of Community competence and [qualified majority voting] to cover negotiations on foreign direct investment. However, certain areas, such as bilateral investment treaties, decisions on inward and outward investment, export promotion and export financing would need to be ring-fenced. 61 German business was reportedly also critical. 62 The German Federation of Industries (BDI) expounded its hesitation in detail in a position paper, which it released later on the occasion of the discussions on the Commission's draft for the so-called 'grandfathering regulation'. 63 The BDI explained that German business worried that future IIAs negotiated by the EU might not attain the high level of investment protection of German BITs. German business also feared that the competence transfer might raise question marks over the continued validity of German BITs and thereby increase investment risks and costs. German business, moreover, lamented that trade and investment disciplines should not be included in the same agreements. Investment negotiations were about setting legal standards, whereas trade negotiations were about bargaining over market access concessions. The BDI manifestly worried that high investment protection and post-establishment treatment standards might be traded off for enhanced market access commitments. Finally, BDI and government officials interviewed for this study added that German business generally preferred keeping policy-making at the national level, because they perceived the EU's political landscape as opaque and difficult to navigate. 73 Article III-314: "By establishing a customs union in accordance with Article III-151, the Union shall contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and on foreign direct investment, and the lowering of customs and other barriers."
74 Article III-315: "The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in goods and services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies. The common commercial policy shall be conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action…" public opted in referenda to reject the Constitutional Treaty. The negative outcomes of these votes in allegedly pro-European founding Member States made it politically impossible to further pursue the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty. After a reflection period, European policy-makers came to the conclusion that the EU had, nevertheless, to be reformed in order to keep it governable after the 
Conclusion and Outlook
The article traced the evolution of the EU's competence in international investment policy from the Treaty of Rome (1958) to the Treaty of Lisbon (2009). So why and how did the EU gradually acquire legal competences in this key domain of international economic governance?
An overview of the findings
The findings of the article lend strong support to neo-functionalist and institutionalist thinking on European integration. 77 The article shows that Commission entrepreneurship was decisive in extending the EU's competences in international investment policy. It persistently pushed the issue onto IGC agendas, had strategic recourse to the CJEU and pointed to the evolving trade agenda in order to build momentum for a competence extension. While strategic recourse to the CJEU proved little effective, As political economy models account for business mobilisation and lobbying efforts on the basis of welfare impacts of policy measures, the finding implies that international investment policy and agreements may have only a limited impact on business operations, profits and welfare. The study thereby ties into a growing economic literature, which critically assesses the costs and benefits of international investment policy and agreements for states and national economies. 81 Ultimately, the finding also has ramifications for current debates on reforming international investment policy and in particular investment protection and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). As business seems to take little interest in these issues -with the notable exception of the highly politicised debates on the simmering dispute, the Commission has recently asked the CJEU to delimit the scope of the EU's new competences in relation to the EU-Singapore FTA. 83 Against the background of this article, the Commission's recourse to the CJEU appears as yet another step to consolidate the EU's role in international investment policy. While this study does not seek to discuss the various methods to interpret European law and possible justifications for a narrow or broad interpretation of the EU's new competences in international investment policy, it sheds extensive light on the travaux préparatoires.
It shows that the authors of the European Treaties hardly intended to provide the EU with a firm legal competence in international investment policy. Hence, a historically-grounded interpretation of the new competence should lead to a narrow and literal interpretation of the EU's new competences, which may limit the EU's political room for manoeuvre in the international investment regime. An extensive literature discusses possible interpretations and delimitations in further detail. 84 In the context of the present study, it is more important to assess the political role of the CJEU in this 
